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Abstract: This article analyzes the current debate surrounding the dispute over the 
official memory of the coup d’état and the corporate-military dictatorship implanted in 
Brazil in 1964. It is based on the reaction of former political agents of the institution 
(currently military reserve officers) and private websites and blogs that were created in 
order to constitute a space of discourse defending the interests of these military and the 
institutional memories of the coup and the dictatorship. Complementarily, it discusses 
how the regime’s “propaganda” reinforced the construction of this memory through the 
speeches published in the Army’s newsletter, specifically on the commemoration of March 
31, and institutional bibliographical production.
Keywords: 1964 coup, dictatorship from 1964 to 1985, military memory.
Resumo: O artigo tem por objetivo analisar o debate atual envolvendo a disputa pela 
memória oficial sobre o golpe e a ditadura empresarial-militar implantada no Brasil em 
1964. Tomaremos por base a reação dos ex-agentes políticos da instituição (atualmente 
oficiais militares da reserva), e os sites e blogs privados que foram criados no intuito de 
constituírem um espaço de discurso de defesa dos interesses desses militares e da memória 
institucional sobre o golpe e a ditadura. De modo complementar, trabalharemos como 
a “propaganda” do regime reforçou a construção dessa memória através dos discursos 
publicados no Noticiário do Exército, especificamente, sobre as comemorações do 31 de 
março, e da produção bibliográfica institucional.
Palavras-chave: golpe de 1964, ditadura 1964-1985, memória militar. 
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Introduction
In recent years, memory has been a major issue in 
discussing the dictatorship. Initially this debate was pursued 
in the academic environment, but it has gained projection 
beyond this milieu as a consequence of actions such as the 
so-called “escrachos” [bashings] denouncing former agents 
of the State as torturers, mobilizations to change the names 
of schools, streets and squares that had received the names 
of icons of the dictatorship, campaigns to change former 
facilities of the Department of Political and Social Order 
(Departamento de Ordem Política e Social – DOPS) into 
centers of memory, and in particular the establishment of 
the National Truth Commission (Comissão Nacional da 
Verdade – CNV) and its congeners at a state and municipal 
level, as well as the pressure to revise the Law of Amnesty, 
including the punishment of the agents of the State in-
volved in crimes during the dictatorship. 
At the same time there is a noticeably increased 
tension between the groups that defend such actions and 
the military institutions, especially the reserve officers, 
around the (re)construction of the memory of the events 
of March and April 1964, as well as the entire regime 
until its decline in 1985.
The implementation of the Ministry of Defense 
in 1999, the election of President Lula and, more recently, 
of President Dilma Rousseff (a former participant in the 
armed struggle) gradually intensified the debates involving 
the memory of this recent period in Brazilian history. 
While, on the one hand, actions of this government, such 
as the implementation of the National Truth Commission 
and the Law of Access to Information (Lei de Acesso à 
Informação – LAI) generated the opportunity to further 
the historical critique of the 1964-1985 period, on the 
other hand, in their tracks, they also aroused old and re-
newed tensions and disputes regarding the memory of that 
period. A specific moment in which this “war of memo-
ries” became more important occurred in February 2012.
On February 16th, the presidents of the Military 
Clubs published a manifesto in their portal criticizing 
the President of the Republic and two Ministers who 
advocated that the Law of Amnesty be revoked. This re-
action received publicity and was debated in various media. 
After it was removed from the portal, another document 
appeared, this time published on the site called A Verdade 
Sufocada [The Asphyxiated Truth] and signed by people 
from the military reserve reaffirming the initial criticism.
Around this specific case,3 the present article aims 
at analyzing the current debate involving the dispute for 
the official memory of the coup and the corporate-mil-
itary dictatorship4 implemented in Brazil in 1964. We 
will focus our discussion on the reaction of the former 
political agents of the institution (currently military 
reserve officers) and the private sites and blogs that were 
established to provide a space for discourse to advocate the 
interests of these military and the institutional memory of 
the coup and the dictatorship. Complementarily, we will 
discuss how the “propaganda” of the regime supported 
the construction of this memory through the speeches 
published in the Noticiário do Exército [Army Newsletter], 
specifically on the commemorations of March 31, and the 
institutional bibliographic production.5
The defense of memory
The defense of the institutional 
memory by the Armed Forces
The constructions of memory in general are part 
of a process of dispute over political hegemony.6 As well 
written by Fernando Rosas, memory
is an essential aspect of the struggle for political and 
ideological hegemony in our societies. In other words, 
when we summon, when we inscribe Memory in the 
debates of today, we are not only looking back, that 
is, we are not taking refuge in the past, we are not 
escaping to nostalgia, we are necessarily – whatever 
the more or less assumed meaning of the exercise is –
3 This option is methodologically justified by the belief that often it is the particularized, qualitative analyses that show us details, signs revealing a greater phenomenon, which 
more general analyses are not able to perceive. They make it possible to generalize conclusions and expose connections that numerical data often deny or even hide (Ginzburg, 
4 Currently the term “civilian-military” has been used a lot to define the 1964 coup and the dictatorship that followed it. In order to affirm a collaboration of “society” in building 
the regime, we believe that from this perspective “society” appears as homogeneous, which is a mystifying view that erases the class-related meaning of the process. This idea 
of “civilian-military” also includes a corporate perception of the military themselves: the world divided between them (the military) and the “civilians”, who are all those who are 
not military. In other words, we believe that it is a very generic term that does not define who won and whom the dictatorship served. On the other hand, the definition of the 
coup and of the regime as entrepreneurial-military – first coined by René Dreifuss (1981) and adopted some time ago by a segment of the field of historiography – focuses on 
the elements that define the social content of the political regime. As such, it states that what we really had in 1964 and throughout the dictatorship was the collaboration of 
a part of Brazilian society. In this sense, even when Dreifuss also uses the term civilian-military, he does so in a consistent way, since it refers to a class-related meaning of the 
coup, emphasizing the participation of the bourgeoisie in the 1964 context and in conducting the dictatorship. The term “entrepreneurial-military” has been gaining acceptance 
both in academic and non-academic milieus after the National Truth Commission and some state truth commissions adopted this perspective.
5 The structure of this article is based on the work of Fernando da Silva Rodrigues in the Project called Faces da redemocratização: os movimentos sociais e suas memórias 
precedentes e subsequentes à Lei da Anistia, de 1979, no Brasil, coordinated by Ricardo Pimenta, whose objective is to seek to understand the actions of the trade union move-
ment, students, alternative press and military in the struggle for redemocratization, emphasizing the debates about the Amnesty which was enacted in 1979, besides involving 
a reflection on the construction of the official memory of the 1964 coup and the dictatorship.
6 Antonio Gramsci’s concept of “hegemony”, in general lines, can be seen as the consented rule of a social class over the others, in ideological terms – and not only via coercion 
– especially of the bourgeoisie over the working class in a capitalist society (Gramsci, 1991).
História Unisinos
531
The Brazilian military reserve officers and the defense of the institutional memory of March 31, 1964
discussing the civilizational contents, the societal 
representations, the political and ideological contents 
that structure the discourses on the world of today and 
of tomorrow … (Rosas, 2009, p. 84).
Accepting that this observation is correct, as well as 
the fact that there is an ongoing dispute for the construction 
of a memory of the 1964-1985 period, it would then be 
correct to say that we live in a context in which political he-
gemony is being disputed. This strife, however, did not begin 
in 2012. Therefore, before we take time to look specifically 
at the debate that took place in that year, we must return to 
the origin of this process of disputing the constitution of a 
memory around the coup and the dictatorship. 
João Roberto Martins Filho (2003, p. 3-4) says that 
“the military narrative was constructed as a response to 
the initial wave of texts from the left”. Thus, he situates 
the beginning of the phenomenon of a dispute for the 
memory as the end of the 1970s, at the time when the 
first works were published with versions of ex-militants 
in the armed struggle about their experiences during the 
dictatorship. On the other hand, Daniel Aarão Reis Filho 
(2004, p. 126-127) dates the beginning of this process as 
1964, when the right tried to present the coup as a saving 
intervention to defend democracy, and the left erased the 
radical and confrontational aspect of the sectors at the left, 
victimizing those who were defeated in 1964 and stig-
matizing the military as gorillas. Even if we disagree with 
the conclusion of Aarão Reis Filho regarding the action 
of the left, we believe that his chronological framework 
is more precise than that of Martins Filho.
In fact, since the first moments of the dictatorship 
– and even before the coup – there was an effort to seek a 
legitimation for taking power and the installation of the new 
regime. In newspaper editorials, speeches of those involved 
and/or their supporters, among other means, an attempt was 
made to construct for the general public the idea that the 
new situation was the result of an effort that aimed at saving 
Brazil from the danger of becoming communist. This, how-
ever, was not an effort based only on public demonstrations 
and aimed at the external public. The military were not a 
cohesive group, as is shown by the great number of military 
who lost their political rights, many immediately after the 
coup (Vasconcelos, 2010). Even within the Armed Forces, 
it was necessary to construct and reaffirm the constitutional 
memory of the “revolution” and the regime.
Internally, the Brazilian army uses the Noticiário 
do Exército (NE) [Army Newsletter] as the main space to 
maintain the memory of the events of March 31, 1964. 
This is a medium to give the members of the Armed 
Forces a record of the speeches made by the Minister/
Commander of the Army and various types of information 
of interest to the members of the institution.7 For purpose 
of analysis, we divided the presence of the speeches on 
During the dictatorship Democratic period
1965 – Found
1966 – Found
1967 – Found
1968 – Found
1969 – Found
1970 – Found
1971 – Found
1972 – No speech
1973 – No speech
1974 – Found
1975 – Found
1976 – Found
1977 – Not found
1978 – Found
1979 – Found
1980 – Found
1981 – Found
1982 – Found
1983 – Found
1984 – Found
1985 – Found
1986 – Found
1987 – Found
1988 – Found
1989 – Found
1990 – Found
1991 – Found
1992 – Found
1993 – Found
1994 – Found
1995 – Found
1996 – No speech
1997 – Not found
1998 – Not found
1999 – Found
2000 – Found
2001 – Found
2002 – Found
2003 – No speech
2004 – No speech
2005 – Found
2006 – Found
2007 – No speech
2008 – No speech
2009 – No speech
2010 – No speech
2011 – No speech
2012 – No speech
Chart 1. Noticiários do Exército – finding of speeches on March 31.
Sources: Arquivo Histórico do Exército. Acervo Institucional.
7 Published daily – except weekends and holidays – the Noticiário do Exército is edited by the Centro de Comunicação Social do Exército, the department responsible for dis-
seminating the message and for the institutional publicity. Informative and official, it is different, for example, from the Revista do Clube Militar, which is private, and from the A 
Defesa Nacional and Revista da ESG magazines, which are technical-professional periodicals that serve the ideological, scientific and professional interests of the Armed Forces. 
Directed at the in-house public of the Army, the NE has no juridical-administratively legitimacy, i.e. it is not a document, on the contrary of the Boletim do Exército and the Diário 
Oficial da União. It is relevant because it is one of the instruments that the Army uses in its attempt to create a political identity among its in-house public. Due to its periodicity 
and because it is mandatory reading for all members of the Force, we believe that the subliminal ideological message conveyed has a potential to reach a large part of the Force.
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the coup in the NE into two moments: the period of 
the dictatorship (1964-1985) and the democratic period 
(post-1985) (Chart 1).
Analyzing the chart one finds that the period char-
acterized as a dictatorship was marked by the annual and 
almost systematic presence of the speeches for the preser-
vation of the institutional memory of the coup, except for 
the years of 1972 and 1973, for which we did not find any 
record.8 This frequency is part of a more general picture 
of efforts to solidify the institutional memory of the coup. 
Until a short while ago, March 31 was officially 
part of the commemorative dates of Brazilian military 
institutions, as a way of remembering the “Democratic 
Revolution” of 1964 and the period under the control of 
the General-Presidents. Celso Castro had already noted 
that, from the coup until 1974, the government encour-
aged these celebrations. 
In a dictatorial context, with practically complete 
absence of individual freedoms, such a reaffirmation might 
appear unnecessary. However, after the initial “ecstasy” 
of the victory of 1964 had passed, dissonant voices were 
soon heard. Already on the commemoration of the second 
anniversary of the “revolution” there were complaints, 
such as that of Carlos Lacerda, who, unsatisfied with the 
established reality, said that there was nothing to praise. 
Despite these criticisms, the festivities continued in an 
ascending line until the tenth anniversary, on which a 
number of activities to commemorate the “revolution” 
were held (Castro, 2008, p. 131). Slowly, however, this 
celebration diminished: in 1986, by order of the Minister 
of the Army, Leônidas Pires Gonçalves, it was limited to 
the barracks; in 1995 the joint order of the day of the three 
military ministers ended; and in 2011 it was forbidden 
even inside the barracks. The NE records confirm this 
tendency.
In a more detailed analysis, we perceive that over 
the years there was a continued effort to construct “March 
31” as a national movement, a real revolution, in which the 
breakdown of order – never characterized as a coup in the 
institutional discourse – appears as the result of a call by 
the Brazilian people and the military as those who carried 
out the mission to save Brazil from the communist danger, 
as denoted by the speech published in the NE in 1979.
When disaster appeared imminent and irretrievable, 
and the process of deterioration  already threatened 
the very discipline of the Armed Forces, the Brazilian 
people as a whole, supported by the more representative 
sectors of the nation, decided to call a stop to that state 
of affairs (Noticiário do Exército, March 31, 1979).
In brief, over the years one can see that the purpose 
of the celebration was to legitimize the seizure of power, 
the presence of the Armed Forces in politics and the 
regime itself as guarantor of the security needed for the 
development of the country, as celebrated by the Doc-
trine of National Security, of the Superior War School. 
In speeches like that of 1971, in the political-economic 
context of strong repression against the armed struggle 
and the existence of the “Brazilian economic miracle”, that 
task – which was self-assigned, but presented as conferred 
by the Brazilian people – is even more transparent:
In the factories, industries, businesses, in the f ields, 
there is a great effort to produce. The Army is also 
present, improving itself, and researching, executing 
or cooperating, to give Brazil the full benefits of its 
core activity – security (Noticiário do Exército, March 
31, 1971).
In general, therefore, during this period the 
speeches have the clear purpose of keeping the memory 
of the winners alive. In this phase “March 31” is a festive 
date for the Armed Forces – with formations, exhibitions, 
statements by the President on a national network – which 
tries to keep up to date in the official press of the military 
institutions the anniversary of the “Brazilian Democratic 
Revolution”, as it is characterized internally. These mo-
ments, however, reveal moves in the struggle to construct 
and affirm a memory of the 1964 coup. Even though it 
was not possible, at that time, to have a public presence 
of contesting voices, this does not mean that the battle 
for memory had not yet begun. If at a certain moment a 
given memory is dominant, this supremacy does not mean 
erasing other memories, it does not mean that it is the 
only one. According to Michael Pollak (1989, p. 4-8), at 
times of crisis the memories that are kept underground 
come to the surface, generating a dispute among them. 
This critical period would soon come. Amid the process 
of “slow, gradual and secure” distension, begun in the mid 
1970s, the commemoration of “March 31” began to be less 
important. On the other hand, the contestation of the po-
litical situation grew in volume. This was the occasion that 
until then unheard voices needed to be heard in public. 
Between 1977 and 1979, years in which, respec-
tively, Em câmera lenta, a testimony-novel by Renato 
Tapajós, and O que é isso, companheiro?, a best-seller by 
Fernando Gabeira were published, and 1985, when the 
results of Project Brasil nunca mais [Brazil Never Again] 
appeared, a number of works were published (memoirs, 
biographies and autobiographies, written not only by 
8 At this time, we are unable to analyze the reason for this absence. Any conclusion would be reckless and might be merely groundless speculation.
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former participants in the armed struggle, but also by jour-
nalists) whose narrative structure was the denunciation 
of tortures suffered during the dictatorship. Therefore, in 
the final phase of the dictatorship, while the memory of 
the left about the period became structured and found a 
public, the official celebrations lost support and drew back. 
As Eduardo Heleno de Jesus Santos appropriately notes, 
in the final years of the dictatorship, the Army 
sought to maintain the symbolism of the date in its 
orders of the day, but reduced its dissemination … 
Without popular support, the anniversary of the 
Revolution would become, from 1983 onwards, by 
initiative of the Armed Forces themselves, a strictly 
martial ceremony, and the scenes of March 1964, with 
thousands of people supporting the intervention, would 
remain in the past… (Santos, 2012, p. 5).
During the democratic period – returning to the 
chart about “Noticiário do Exército” and the finding of 
speeches made on March 31 – we note the alternation of 
the presence of speeches in memory of “March 31, 1964”. 
This is the period in which the celebrations become, year 
by year, emptier and more limited to the barracks and, in 
parallel, protests against the regime grow, indicating new 
movements in the battle of memories.
The current moment, more than two decades after the 
historical fact took place, is right for a serene reflection 
on the results achieved in all f ields of national life, spe-
cif ically in the transition to democracy. It is true that 
there were diversions and delays. There were, however, 
many achievements, and they deserve to be remembered 
(Noticiário do Exército, March 31, 1988).
It can be seen that in the context of redemocratiza-
tion there is already an alternation in the characterization 
of the regime. The defense is maintained, but there is 
no longer an absolutely positive evaluation. In a time of 
criticism of the regime, there is an acknowledgment that 
there were problems during its trajectory, presented as 
“deviations and delays”, but what prevails is the attempt 
to reaffirm the supposed “achievements”. This effort 
indicates that, although the manifestation favorable to 
the regime remains in the institutional speeches, from 
the end of the last term of a General-President and the 
installation of the so-called “New Republic”, according 
to the reports of the military themselves, those defeated 
at arms became victorious in the battle for the historical 
memory (Castro, 2008, p. 133-135).
However, just as the hegemony of the institutional 
memory up to the mid-1970s did not mean that other 
memories did not exist, the supremacy of a memory 
critical of the dictatorship did not completely asphyxiate 
the version of those who defended the “revolution”. While 
institutionally these voices lost space, new ways to dis-
seminate this memory began to appear. In this sense, the 
outstanding books at the time were Brasil sempre (1986), 
by Lieutenant Marco Pollo Giordani, who served in the 
DOI-Codi, and Rompendo o silêncio (1987), by Colonel 
Carlos Alberto Brilhante Ustra, also a former agent of the 
repression, accused of having committed torture during 
the dictatorship. But these were still isolated initiatives. 
The consolidation of similar, informal alternatives as loci 
to disseminate a favorable memory of the 1964 coup 
only occurred in the next decade. The changes were more 
visible at the institutional level. More than the alternation 
regarding the existence of the speeches, there were changes 
in the institutional discourse at every further phase of the 
redemocratization process. 
In every phase before and immediately after the 
1988 Constitution, up to 2002, we find records of speeches 
in the NE.9 However, the abovementioned speech made 
in 1988 already shows a certain flexibilization in the 
radical style of writing about the coup. The political and 
social juncture, marked by the process of legitimation of 
the transition to democracy with the new Constitution, 
is reflected in the military discourse, but this does not 
eliminate the idea of the importance of the seizure of 
power in 1964 as the driver of Brazilian modernization 
and the base for democratic transition.
This rhetorical flexibilization was maintained 
after the swearing in of the first President elected after 
the period of the dictatorship, in 1989. From then on, 
arguments more aligned with the new democratic reality 
began to appear in institutional discourses.
This perception increased during the Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso Administration, because of his left-
wing militancy during the dictatorship. According to 
Santos (2012, p. 10), 
in 1995, during the Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
Administration, for the f irst time no order of the day 
was published concerning March 31. According to the 
news from O Globo at the time, the military did not 
carry out their traditional ritual, out of consideration 
for President Fernando Henrique. According to the 
story in the Rio de Janeiro newspaper, high-ranking 
off icers who preferred not to say their name stated 
that it was logical not to celebrate March 31, since 
9 Except for 1996, when there was no speech. For 1997 and 1998, also, we cannot say that the speeches occurred because we could not find them.
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the President was a man of the left. A high-ranking 
off icer of the Navy said: “It is obvious that we are not 
going to commemorate a revolution when our highest 
leaders of today were, at the time, all from the left”, 
while another, from the Air Force, stated that there 
were no “reasons to commemorate in a government 
where all of the players belonged to the opposite team” 
(O Globo, March 31, 1995, p. 6).
It should be added that on December 4, 1995 
Law n° 9.140 was enacted (Lei dos Mortos e Desapa-
recidos Políticos [Law of Political Dead and Missing]), 
which created the Special Commission on the Dead and 
Missing (Comissão Especial sobre Mortos e Desapare-
cidos – CEMDP), showing that the State acknowledged 
the responsibilities of public agents for acts of repression 
during the dictatorship, including abductions, torture, 
arrests and murder. Furthermore, it allowed the families 
of the missing to ask for death certificates and receive 
compensation (Brasil, 1995).
Then, in 2009, the online Project “Memórias 
Reveladas” [Revealed Memories] was started. It was 
also known as the Center of References for the Political 
Struggles in Brazil (1964-1985) (Centro de Referências 
para as Lutas Políticas no Brasil [1964-1985]), supervised 
by the National Archives and aimed at giving the public 
information about the political history of Brazil. Finally, 
the Law of Access to Information of November 18, 2011 
(Brasil, 2011a) was enacted, regulating the constitutional 
right of citizens to have access to information, and the 
National Truth Commission (Brasil, 2011b), sanctioned 
by President Dilma Rousseff on the same date and of-
ficially installed on May 16, 2012, aiming to investigate 
human rights violations by agents of the State in Brazil 
between 1946 and 1988.
It is in this context that the defense of the mem-
ory of the regime more emphatically migrated from the 
institutional to the informal sphere and began to be led 
by military from the reserve. Initially in a more discrete 
manner, by holding small celebrations in which “March 
31” was remembered, as in the case, for instance, of the 
mass held in 1989 at the Church of Santa Cruz dos 
Militares, with the presence of high-ranking officers who 
were already in the reserve, including General João Batista 
Figueiredo, former President of Brazil (Santos, 2012, p. 
7). At other moments, in an explicitly political manner, 
as when military of the reserve who were members of 
the Navy Club – unsatisfied with the non-publication 
of the order of the day concerning “March 31” in 1995, 
and alleging that the nation and younger people in the 
Armed Forces needed to be informed about the real 
reasons for the outbreak and about the purposes of the 
movement – presented a motion suggesting that the en-
tity should publish a message commemorating the date 
in the Club bulletin (Santos, 2012, p. 10). In addition to 
these collective initiatives, there were other, individual 
initiatives, such as books: the second by Colonel Carlos 
Alberto Brilhante Ustra, A verdade sufocada (2006), and 
BACABA – Memórias de um guerreiro de selva da Guerrilha 
do Araguaia (2007) and BACABA II – Toda a verdade sobre 
a Guerrilha do Araguaia e a Revolução de 1964 (2011), 
by Lieutenant José Vargas Jimenez, who, when he was 
still a second sergeant in the Army, was involved in the 
repression of the Araguaia guerrilla war.
These actions did not mean that the institution 
stopped defending the regime. Suffice it to remember 
that in 1999 one of the last acts of the Minister of the 
Army, General Gleuber Vieira, before this Ministry was 
replaced by the Ministry of Defense, was to approve the 
Oral History of the Army Project about March 31, 1964. 
Because of this initiative 250 people were interviewed, 
both civilians and military, and, consequently, in 2003 the 
Army Library (Bibliex – Biblioteca do Exército) published 
a 15-volume collection. 
The collection 1964 – 31 de Março: o movimento 
revolucionário e a sua história was coordinated by Reserve 
General Aricildes de Moraes Motta and shows, on the 
back cover of all volumes, passages from editorials and 
newspaper stories of O Globo,10 Folha de S. Paulo, Estado 
de S. Paulo and Correio da Manhã praising the movement 
and the regime, supporting the claim – always present in 
the military discourses – that the press gave full support 
to the Armed Forces in 1964.
The objective of the Army, when it decided to 
carry out this project, was to keep the memory of the 
institution alive, claiming that in 1964 a “democratic 
revolution” occurred in the country, not a coup d’état 
that implanted a dictatorship. The central idea of the 
testimonies is the defense of the thesis that the military 
freed the country from communism and brought peace 
and prosperity to a nation that was embroiled in economic, 
political and social chaos. The launch of this collection 
was the last great official movement to defend the coup 
and the dictatorship. Concretely, a change in the locus of 
institutional defense of the coup and the dictatorship is 
currently becoming established: the officers on active duty 
and the media and official ceremonies of dissemination/
celebration are leaving the scene, and the military of the 
10 Recently O Globo published an editorial with an attempt at a “mea culpa” for its support to the coup and the dictatorship, admitting that this option was a mistake. This action 
is an example showing that the (re)construction of memory is not limited to the military (O Globo, 2013)
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reserve and private spaces such as military clubs, sites and 
blogs are coming in. Even if it is no longer hegemonic, the 
institutional memory of the coup and the dictatorship is 
refusing to go underground.
The defense of the institutional 
memory by the military in the 
reserve 
There is a logic to the choice of private spaces to 
discuss Army policy, especially by the reserve officers: 
these spaces, theoretically, are not subject to stringent 
institutional repression, because of the legal codes, such 
as the Disciplinary Rules of the Army, which deal partic-
ularly with this segment. Although paragraph 1 of article 
40 gives the Army Commander the competence to apply 
all and any disciplinary punishment, to which the active 
and non-active military are subject (Brasil, 2002), these 
punishments are usually less traumatic than those that 
affect the military who are in a situation of active duty, 
because, since they are non-active (retired), the possible 
administrative punishments which these military may 
suffer are not the loss of rank, detriment to their career 
nor financial reduction. Therefore, these spaces allow a 
critical freedom that was of interest to the defenders of 
institutional memory in the new political reality.
The Military Club
A first example of space to maintain institutional 
memory and political debates is the Military Club, which 
can be defined as
a civil association with headquarters and legal domicile 
in the city of Rio de Janeiro, founded on June 26, 1887. 
Its main objective is to “create greater ties of union and 
solidarity among the officers of the armed forces”, “then 
the interests of the members and struggle for measures 
that will protect their rights”, and to “encourage civic 
and patriotic manifestations and take an interest in 
matters that hurt or may hurt the national and mili-
tary honor” (Lamarão, 2001, p. 1383-1389).
The Military Club is the only military association 
that has Navy, Army and Air Force officers. The active, re-
serve and retired officers can be accepted as full members. 
The association has a monthly publication, the Revista do 
Clube Militar magazine.
From 1940 to 1960 the Military Club was an im-
portant place for political discussion, not only regarding 
strictly military issues, but also more generally, as in the 
case of the intense debate on how explorations for oil 
should be structured. However, after a broad reformulation 
of the aspects related to political activism which followed 
the debates involving nationalists and conservatives in 
1940-1960, and the defense of the regime instituted in 
1964, the Military Club lost its political importance, and 
it maintained this characteristic in the period after the 
1988 constitution. However, the need for political debate 
and a freer manifestation outside the Army transformed it 
again into a space to propose and discuss political options. 
Obviously, the Military Club did not regain its previous 
importance. Its political significance today is nothing 
like it was until the 1960s. This reality, however, does not 
invalidate the claim that there is an internal attempt to 
recover, even if only in part, the prestige of the past and to 
present itself as the vector for the defense of a particular 
memory about 1964.
Signs of the insertion of the Military Club into 
this “battle of memories” can be noticed already in 1996, 
when General Hélio Ibiapina became president of this 
body. During his term there was an intensification of the 
efforts to reaffirm the institutional memory of the coup. 
For this purpose the Revista do Clube Militar began to 
emphasize “March 31” and the regime. At the same time 
encouragement was given to creating groups among the 
reserve officers aimed at obtaining the support of society 
to the cause of the “revolution”, and the criticism of human 
rights entities in their struggle to obtain indemnification 
for citizens who suffered the action of the State during 
the dictatorship (Santos, 2012, p. 10-11). This position 
continued and, in 1999, the Military Club prepared a 
booklet with speeches of officers aiming to keep the 
military memory of “March 31” alive and disseminate it. 
This objective appears again in a Revista do Clube Militar 
editorial signed by General Hélio Ibiapina, in 2001. From 
this editorial we extracted the following fragment: 
Today almost all the military on active service have 
only heard talk about what happened on March 31, 
1964. Military and civilians, in the reserve or ac-
tive, and millions of young people suffer, nowadays, 
a tremendous and effective campaign of false stories 
and distorted information, lies launched constantly 
and in all directions, seeking to modify History. 
It is, therefore, essential to tell and repeat to exhaustion 
what happened and why it happened in those days 
(cited by Santos, 2012, p. 13).
With increasingly insignificant official celebra-
tions, the Military Club became possibly the main locus 
for the dissemination of the institutional memory about 
the 1964 coup. In this sense, on February 16, 2012 the 
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portal of that entity published a manifesto to the nation 
that ultimately produced tensions between the military 
reservists and the federal government. 
Signed by the presidents of the three military of-
ficer clubs, the high point of the text is a criticism against 
President Dilma Rousseff and an accusation against 
Ministers Maria do Rosário, of the Office of Human 
Rights of the Presidency of the Republic, and Eleonora 
Menicucci, of the Special Office of Policies for Women in 
Brazil, because of statements that supposedly proved that 
they were in the service of what was labeled as “sectarian 
minorities” prepared to reopen the wounds of the past:
Manifesto of the Military Clubs
...
Right at the beginning of her term, the Military Clubs 
transcribed the message that the then candidate sent 
to the military on active duty and in the reserve, to 
the Armed Forces pensioners and to members of the 
Clubs. In the message the candidate made several 
commitments. When they transcribed it, the Clubs 
were giving her a vote of confidence, expecting that 
she would keep them. 
As she completes her f irst year in off ice, slowly one sees 
the President departing from the premises that she 
herself stipulated. It seems that the concern to govern 
for one part of the population is much greater than the 
wish to meet the interests of all Brazilians. 
Specif ically, last week, and for three consecutive days, 
there were examples of the abovementioned statement.
On Wednesday, February 8, the Minister of the Office 
of Human Rights gave an interview … in which 
once again she asserted the possibility that the parties 
that considered themselves offended by facts that had 
occurred during the military governments could f ile 
sues in court, seeking to establish the criminal respon-
sibility of the agents of repression, similarly to what is 
happening in neighboring countries. Once again this 
off icer of the Republic placed her opinion above the 
recent decision of the Federal Supreme Court, which 
had been urged to opine on the validity of the Law of 
Amnesty. And the President did not speak publicly to 
contradict her subordinate. 
Two days later Mrs. Eleonora Menicucci was sworn 
in as Minister of the Office of Policies for Women. In 
her speech the Minister, in the presence of the President, 
leveled exacerbated criticism at the military govern-
ments and … emphasized the fact that she had fought 
for democracy [sic], at the same time as she rendered 
homage to the comrades who had fallen in the fray. 
The audience, including Madam President, applauded 
her speech. Now, we all know that the group to which 
Mrs. Eleonora belonged conducted its actions aiming 
at the forceful implementation of a dictatorship and 
never intended for it to be a democracy.
Finally, to complete the week, the Workers’ Party, to 
which the President belongs, celebrated its 32nd anni-
versary. On the occasion the Political Resolutions taken 
by the Party were publicized. The item that says that 
PT will make an effort with society to bring back our 
memory of the struggle for democracy [sic] during the 
military dictatorship was highlighted. It can be said 
that the assertion is a fallacy, since when the Party 
was founded the government had already promoted the 
political opening, including the possibility of founding 
other political parties, thus ending the two-party system.
The Military Clubs express their concern at the man-
ifestations of the President’s assistants, to which she, 
as the nation’s top mandatary, does not respond by 
publicly expressing her disagreement with the position 
they and the party to which she is aff iliated have tak-
en, and await with positive expectation the attitude 
that will be taken by the President of all Brazilians 
and not of sectarian minorities or political parties … 
(Cabral, 2012).
The publication of the manifesto had repercussions 
in the newspapers and on the internet, and heated up 
the debates on the coup, the dictatorship and the current 
political process. A few days later it was excluded from the 
portal. The justification of this action, in a laconic note – 
also soon taken off the site – was given by the presidents 
of the Military Clubs, who limited themselves to stating 
that they disavowed the document of the 16th.11 However, 
the criticisms contained in the document were appropri-
ated by groups constituted especially by reserve military 
people who prepared another document and disseminated 
it through sites and blogs belonging to the military and 
relatives of the military with conservative profiles.
The sites and blogs
Once the Special Commission on the Dead and 
Missing had been established in the mid-1990s, there was 
an intensification of the clamor for the punishment of the 
agents of the State responsible for abductions, torture and 
11 Officially, the government did not issue any determination to withdraw the manifesto. Journalists ascribed this order to the Commander of the Army, General Enzo Perri (see 
O Globo, 2012). However, as we shall see further on, the groups of military people who took up the defense of the note content accused the Minister of Defense, Celso Amorim, 
of having pressured the commanders of the three Armed Forces to have the document removed from the site.
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deaths during the dictatorship. Fearing that this pressure 
would become a revision of the Law of Amnesty, military 
people, mostly in the reserve, organized themselves in 
groups to defend those accused of these crimes. These 
initiatives prospered and generated sites and blogs that 
have become new loci to preserve the institutional mem-
ory and have contributed to feeding tensions between the 
defenders and the critics of this memory.12 One of these 
sites is Grupo Terrorismo Nunca Mais (Ternuma) (Grupo 
Terrorismo Nunca Mais, [s.d.]a).
With its headquarters in Rio de Janeiro, Ternuma 
states that it “intends to show the history of terrorist action 
practiced by bad Brazilians”. On September 10, 2012, 14 
years after the group was established, the site had already 
reached the mark of more than 2 million hits. Today there 
are close to 3 million.13 Currently the president of the group 
is a reserve brigadier, Valmir Fonseca Azevedo Pereira, and 
one of the main debates recorded on the site was a campaign 
of solidarity to retired Colonel Carlos Alberto Brilhante 
Ustra, labeled as a “scapegoat” whom the National Truth 
Commission is trying to bring to trial (Ribeiro, 2011).
The structure of the site prioritizes topics such as 
“Revanchism”, “Infliction of Punishment”, “The Chest 
of Truth”, “Articles”, “Historical Truths”, “Counterpoint”, 
“To Think About”, “Memorial” and “Library”. A cursory 
reading finds the ideological direction of the group and 
the intention of keeping a particular version about the 
coup and the dictatorship alive:
Gathered on July 25, 1998, 32 years after the horren-
dous explosions in Recife, a handful of civilian and 
military democrats, not accepting the omission of the 
legal authorities and indignant at the effrontery of the 
revanchist left, organized the group “TERRORISM 
NEVER AGAIN (Terrorismo Nunca Mais – TER-
NUMA”) to bring back the real history of the 1964 
Revolution and once again oppose all those who still 
insist on defending the communist frames of reference, 
misrepresenting themselves as democratic (Grupo 
Terrorismo Nunca mais, [s.d.]b).
In view of this declared objective, it makes com-
plete sense that the site re-published the “Manifesto of 
the Military Clubs” and later posted articles supporting 
the manifesto and rejoicing in the finding of the “power 
of agglutination and diffusion of the internet, considering 
the number of citizens, both military and civilian, who 
placed and continue to place their names on the list of 
support to the messages” (see Chagas, s.d.).
Another important site in this process of preserva-
tion of the military memory about the 1964 coup is that 
of the Inconfidência Group.14 Founded in 1994, in Belo 
Horizonte, its goal, defined on the main page, is to combat 
communism and corruption, strengthen the Armed Forces 
and defend life, family and values of society.
Like Ternuma, the purpose of the Inconfidência 
Group is to challenge communism ideologically, urging the 
military to attack a movement that, according to the site 
articulators, wants to transform Brazil into a new Cuba 
(Grupo Inconfidência, s.d.).
Besides the webpage, the group produces a printed 
newspaper under the same name which aims at bringing 
the “truth of the facts” to the surface. In its articles it 
expresses the general political aims of the organization 
and defends a particular version of the events of the past 
and the present. In special issues of the periodical, both 
in those strictly connected to the regime, such as “March 
31, 1964” and “The Black Book of Terrorism in Brazil”, 
and in those on different topics, such as “The Communist 
Conspiracy of 1935” , “The Communization of Education 
in Brazil”, “Duke of Caxias”, and “Brazil and World War 
II”, there are stereotypes aiming to reinforce a particular 
memorialistic construction of the events of March/April 
1964, the dictatorial period and the Brazilian political 
process in general. Expressions such as “civic-military 
movement of March 31, 1964” and “Brazilian Democratic 
Revolution” are commonly found as a name for the 1964 
coup, as well as – without great theoretical-methodological 
rigor – statements that the Brazilian left was preparing a 
coup d’état or that Brazil was (and still is) in a process of 
communization (Grupo Inconfidência, s.d.).
A third site that deserves mention is A Verdade 
Sufocada [The Asphyxiated Truth] (A Verdade Sufocada, 
s.d.).15 However, in this case it is necessary to take the 
analysis a bit further, since at the beginning of 2012, after 
the “Manifesto of the Military Clubs” was taken off, it 
12 Given their recent use in research in the field of history, there is not yet an established methodological definition for the use of blogs and sites as sources. For this reason, we 
based our work on the method presented by Laurence Bardin (1977) to analyze contents and used it as an instrument for analysis. Based on this model we attempted to separate 
the messages into units of records. Since the topic of research relates to the memory constructed around the 1964 coup, the units of records considered are the “axis-topics” 
around which the portals organized their speeches. As such the basic themes refer to the coup and the dictatorship (“revolution” in the terms presented). Around them one finds 
subtopics such as communism, terrorism and others.
13 Even though the number of hits can be manipulated and not every visitor is a supporter of the theses published, Ternuma, also because of the criticisms it receives, can be 
considered one of the main vehicles for the dissemination of the institutional memory about the coup and the dictatorship. Its Facebook page, created in April 2012, i.e. at the 
height of the political issue discussed by the present article, has currently been “liked” by more than 3 thousand people. A search for the term “Ternuma” in Google brings almost 
50,000 results. These data, we believe, justify its selection as an object of research.
14 The site of the Inconfidência Group does not present a count of the number of hits.
15 There are other sites and blogs with the same profile. We chose to limit ourselves to these three because we consider them more representative.
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became the main space for the military in the reserve to 
present their opinions, continuing the debate begun by 
the Military Club.
On its main page, as in the other sites analyzed, one 
sees the purpose of participating in the political debate 
with a more radical argument. From the word go, it is 
possible to observe the publicity for the launch of the 8th 
edition of the book A verdade sufocada, by Colonel Carlos 
Alberto Brilhante Ustra.
Like the others, the site A Verdade Sufocada is 
structured to become a place for political debate and for 
the maintenance of an institutional memory. This option 
is proved by a brief survey of the topics present in the part 
called “Notícias” [News]: FARC [Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia], MST [Movement of the Landless 
Rural Workers], Foreign Policy, Domestic Policy, Elec-
tions, Corruption, Armed Forces and Counterrevolution 
of 1964. On the other hand, in the area that goes under 
the name “Special” we find the following indexes: Revealed 
Memories, Project ORVIL, It Is Worthwhile Rereading, 
Did You Know?, Indemnities, Revanchism, Truth Com-
mission, Armed Struggles, Amnesty, Forum of São Paulo, 
and Indoctrination. As to its reach, on September 25, 
2012 the site had already had more than 9 million hits. 
Currently it has surpassed 20 millions, which proves the 
interest aroused by the polemical debates of the group.16
As previously mentioned, in February 2012 a 
manifesto of the Military Clubs was published, criticizing 
the President of Brazil and two Ministers. After it was 
removed from the Military Club portal, the negative 
evaluations present in the document were appropriated 
by the A Verdade Sufocada group, which chose to launch 
another manifesto, on February 28, called “Warning to 
the Nation – Let them come, here they shall not pass”, 
defending the position expressed by the presidents of the 
Military Clubs:
Warning to the Nation
“LET THEM COME, HERE THEY SHALL 
NOT PASS”
This is a warning to the Brazilian Nation, signed 
by men whose existence was marked by serving their 
country, guided by the oath they took for it, if necessary 
to give their own life. These are men who represent the 
Army of past generations, and they are responsible for 
the foundations which are the base of the present Army.
As one voice we reaff irm the validity of the content 
of the Manifesto published on the site of the Military 
Club ... and removed from it ... by order of the Minister 
of Defense, whom we do not acknowledge as having 
any kind of authority or legitimacy to do so.
The Military Club is a civil association, not subordi-
nated to anyone except to its Board of Directors, elected 
by its members and with one hundred and twenty 
years of glorious existence, with years of struggle, 
determination, achievements, victories and effective 
participation in relevant cases of our country’s history.
The founding of the Club, in itself, was a major his-
torical fact, which produced significant marks on the 
national context, and was an action undertaken by 
determined men, generated among the socio-political 
and military episodes that marked the end of the 19th 
century. Over time it participated in major events, 
such as the Abolition of Slavery, the Proclamation of 
the Republic, the issue of oil and the Counterrevolution 
of 1964 ….
The Military Club is not intimidated, and will con-
tinue to remain attentive and vigilant, advocating an 
ethical behavior by our public men, ... defending the 
dignity of the military, now wounded and restricted 
by very low salaries and budget cuts, the latter pre-
venting us from having Armed Forces up to the needs 
of External Security and the political strategic profile 
that our country already has. Armed Forces which, in 
a recent survey, proved that they are the most trusted 
institution of the Brazilian People (survey by the Law 
School of the Getúlio Vargas Foundation of São Paulo). 
The Military Club certainly embodies our values, our 
ideals, and one of its aims is to always defend the higher 
interests of the country.
Thus, this was the main purpose of the abovemen-
tioned manifesto, which sees in the approval of the 
“Truth Commission” an irresponsible act of explicit 
revanchism and an affront to the Law of Amnesty 
with the unacceptable consent of the current govern-
ment (Figueiredo et al., 2012). 
Besides considering the creation of the Truth 
Commission as revanchist and an attack on the Law 
of Amnesty, what stands out here is the criticism of the 
interference of the government in the Military Club site 
and the vetoing of the text published there, which was 
critical of the government. 
Tensions increased when the Minister of Defense, 
Celso Amorim, decided, in a conversation with the three 
military commanders, that the one hundred reserve 
16 Just as in the case of Ternuma, we emphasize that the number of hits presented is subject to manipulation. However, we believe that a large part of those who browsed on its 
page were motivated by the arousal of old and new political tensions promoted by the speeches. The almost 3,000 signatures supporting the manifesto, about which we shall 
talk at the right time, corroborate this hypothesis. However, there is also no doubt that a part of these hits is from researchers with varied objectives.
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officers who initially signed the manifesto would be 
punished for indiscipline by their respective forces. As a 
consequence of this first clash with the Minister of De-
fense, the military in the reserve reacted and the support 
of the manifesto against the government increased. As in 
the past, civilians also signed the text.
With daily updates, as we can see in Chart 2, the 
number of supporters gradually grew from the initial 100 
signatures until 2,963 on June 9, 2012.
The first observations clearly show the rapidly 
increasing support process caused by the political debate. 
Between the first days of March and the last update on 
June 9, it grew constantly. However, it is particularly clear 
that certain supporters were removed, contrasting with 
the central aim of winning over new sympathizers to the 
position defended by these military. 
On March 6, the person responsible for the site, 
Maria Joseita Brilhante Ustra, informed on the page that 
the manifesto coordinators had requested that the names 
of the privates who had joined be removed and that she 
was awaiting the justifications for this request. On the 
same day, a new note was published, under the title “Re-
Update of March 3
Generals 61 High Court Justices (Court of Justice, Rio de Janeiro [TJ/RJ]) 01 Colonels 258
Lieutenant Colonels 55 Majors 11 Captains 17
Lieutenants 20 Sublieutenants 15 Sergeants 15
Corporals 02 Private 01 Civilians 191
Total 647
Update of March 4
Generals 77 High Court Justice TJ/RJ 01 Colonels 338
Lieutenant-Colonels 67 Majors 13 Captains 29
Lieutenants 36 Sublieutenants 23 Sergeants 21
Corporals/Privates 05 Civilians 289
Total 906
Update of March 5
Generals 81 High Court Justice TJ/RJ 01 Colonels 384
Lieutenant-Colonels 92 Majors 22 Captains 44
Lieutenants 56 Civilians 332
Total 1.012
Update of March 10
Generals 98 High Court Justice TJ/RJ 01 Colonels 559
Lieutenant-Colonels 132 Majors 26 Captains 69
Lieutenants 102 Civilians 645
Total 1.634
Update of June 9
Generals 130 High Court Justice TJ/RJ 01 Colonels and Commodore 877
Lieutenant-Colonels and 
Commanders (Navy) 232
Majors and Lieutenant 
Commanders (Navy) 48
Captains and 
Lieutenants (Navy) 115
Lieutenants 154 Midshipmen 07 Civilians 1.399
Total 2.963
Chart 2. Update of March 3, 2012.
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moval of names and non-acceptance of supporters – Note 
of the coordinators of ‘Alerta Brasil’ [Warning Brazil]”. 
In the communiqué the person responsible justifies her 
action as an attempt to not increase tensions, now between 
officers and privates, which might result in further internal 
division among these military.
The discourse tries to provide a legal reason for 
removing the names, alleging that the act is based strictly 
on the law and that, although they were grateful for the 
solidarity and union demonstrated, they would not include 
in the list of supporters the names of officers and privates 
on active service. Likewise, they would not record the 
support of reserve and retired privates, in order to avoid 
negative exploitation, since this was an issue that had 
arisen within the Military Club, whose members are all 
officers (A Verdade Sufocada, 2012).
It is also interesting to note that almost half the 
people who gave their support were civilians, while the 
other half consisted of military from the reserve of the 
three forces: Army, Navy and Air Force. This set of sup-
porters, added to the number of supporters whose names 
were removed, leads to asking questions about the degree 
of social insertion of the theses advocated by this group.
As regards the memories of 1964 and the regime, 
Celso Castro classifies the military as three generations: 
the first is composed by those who remained over from 
the regime and whose career had its high point during 
that period. In other words, these are reserve officers who, 
in general, defend the idea that they acted as democrats 
to save Brazil from the communist danger, and they feel 
wronged and resentful about the stigma on the Armed 
Forces since the amnesty; they try to bring back the “truth 
of facts”, emphasizing the support that they received in 
1964, and deny or hide the repression that occurred during 
the dictatorship. They meet basically at the Military Club 
and, in small right-wing groups, promote regular public 
celebrations of the “revolution”, but, according to Castro, 
this generation, due to the age of its members, will soon 
disappear. 
The second is made up of the heads of the military 
who reached the apex of their careers after the transition. 
Most of them are already in the reserve; they defend the 
actions of the military during the regime, but are more 
tolerant of criticism regarding military action during the 
years of the dictatorship, avoid public mention of the 
regime and say that they would prefer it if this page of 
history were turned by means of a historical amnesty for 
“both sides”.
The third generation is based on the younger 
officers, who are still on active duty and distant from the 
regime both as a professional group and in emotional 
terms. They are from military families, which causes so-
ciological isolation among officers, and they suffer from 
the loss of prestige and the stigma on the military since 
the transition (Castro, 2008, p. 140-141).
According to this classification, we can include the 
military involved in the debate of 2012 in the first genera-
tion. Since this group is about to disappear because of age, 
it would be logical to suppose that the tensions it provokes 
would soon be lost in time. However, will their ideas con-
sequently also disappear? Do not the great support of the 
manifesto of solidarity to the Military Club – which was 
only not greater because the names of officers and privates 
on active duty were not recorded – and the great number 
of hits on the sites suggest that this viewpoint still enjoys 
a strong internal and external support? 
In this case it can be said that there is a memory 
of the 1964-1985 period which, although less celebrated, 
refuses to descend definitively to the “cellars” of history. 
Therefore, the possibility that new clashes will arise in 
the near future cannot be ruled out.
There is another warning that must be given and 
which also has a significant value in the “war of memories”: 
although the criticism by these reserve officers is sharp, 
it cannot be considered as representing all the officers 
who are not on active duty. At the same time as there are 
high-ranking military officers who, through celebrations 
and manifestos, defend the right to the institutional mem-
ory regarding the “Democratic Revolution” of 1964 and 
criticize the implementation of the Truth Commission 
and the revision of the Law of Amnesty, another group 
of military officers who lost their political rights after the 
1964 coup defend a contrary position.
The reaction of the military 
in the reserve who lost their 
political rights 
As already mentioned, the supremacy of a given 
memory does not mean that there are no other voices. 
Generally these “forbidden” memories survive stored 
away in informal communication structures (families, 
associations etc.). The military who struggled against 
the coup and the dictatorship used precisely associations 
that gather people who lost their political rights due to 
the dictatorship as a means of preserving not only their 
memories but also their struggle.
Until the mid 1970s, like other groups that op-
posed the regime, these men found it difficult to struggle 
more effectively for their ideas and rights. But, in the con-
text of the distension, with less repression, and as they were 
unsatisfied with the final version of the Law of Amnesty, 
the military who had lost their rights found strength and 
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support to protest. Since then they have organized many 
actions to denounce this law as insufficient and to try to 
broaden its scope.
But, besides being unsatisfied with the Law of 
Amnesty, they are also interested in participating in the 
battle for public memory and in the political debate in 
general. This intention is revealed in initiatives such as the 
project announced by Professor Ivan Cavalcanti Proença 
(2004, p. 163-165), an Army captain in 1964, who lost 
his political rights and is a member of the Democratic 
and Nationalist Association of the Military (Associação 
Democrática e Nacionalista dos Militares – ADNAM). 
This project, in response to the series of books published 
by the Army Library, aims at publishing the memoirs of 
the military punished by the regime. Besides actions such 
as this one, which by nature are more laborious and slow, 
there is an effort for everyday participation in politics, such 
as the intervention in the aforementioned debate of 2012, 
when the officers who lost their political rights decided to 
write an answer to the military who criticized President 
Dilma, two ministers and the implementation of the 
Truth Commission and revision of the Law of Amnesty. 
To the Brazilians
As Retired Officers, members of the Military Clubs, 
we are forced to disagree from the petition signed by 
several Reserve Officers in support of the recent Man-
ifesto of Presidents of the Clubs, which was removed 
from the Military Club site after they were ordered to 
do so by the Force Commanders, who, in an exemplary 
and balanced attitude, recommended that they do so.
This document contained references to President 
Dilma Rousseff, for not having censored her Minis-
ters “who made exacerbated criticisms of the military 
governments”. Now, this document signed by these 
Off icers (of the Reserve and Retired), and also by 
Colonel Carlos Alberto Brilhante Ustra, former 
head of DOI-Codi, the repression apparatus of the 
Dictatorship in São Paulo, who is being accused by 
Justice of torturing political prisoners (a crime that he 
denies), refers in a challenging manner to the Minis-
ter of Defense, Celso Amorim, “in whom they do not 
acknowledge any kind of authority or legitimacy to do 
so”, which in our opinion, besides being disrespectful 
behavior and unacceptable in military life, is, beyond 
any doubt, an act of insubordination, a “break with 
discipline and hierarchy”. …
Hence we wish, to re-establish a truth, that the Presi-
dents of the Military Clubs and some of these gentlemen 
stubbornly will not recognize, that the true democratic 
regime is the one we are living in, and not that of the 
“military governments” that would never have allowed 
such “differences of opinion, belief and political orienta-
tion” (Moreira and Santa Rosa, 2012).
Drafted by Commodores Luiz Carlos de Souza 
Moreira and Fernando de Santa Rosa, two high-ranking 
officers of the Brazilian Navy Reserve, members of Mil-
itary Clubs, the letter “The Military in Defense of De-
mocracy” reveals that the differences among the military 
that existed before 1964 still exist. In the text, the officers 
who lost their political rights in September 1964 due to 
the fact that they held positions as political appointees in 
agencies led by officers who were against the overthrow 
of President João Goulart, besides calling the manifesto 
written by their colleagues foolish, express their regret that 
in the past military personnel of the Armed Forces prac-
ticed torture and other crimes. One of the signatories of 
this document, which shows different opinions among the 
military in the reserve, was Brigadier Rui Moreira Lima, 
a veteran World War II pilot, who also lost his political 
rights after the 1964 coup and died in 2013. 
The issue of age is a problem for this group, as well 
as for the first generation of the military who defend the 
institutional memory of 1964. This is because many of 
their members are quite old and consequently they are 
losing important members who acted as catalysts, as in the 
brigadier’s case, causing fear that the associations in which 
they are gathered will disappear and with them many of 
their struggles and memories. Besides, this group has to 
overcome obstacles imposed by the collective memory 
constructed on the dictatorship, since it resulted in a com-
plete victimization of the civilians and a negative attitude 
toward the military class. This created a dichotomy: on 
the one hand the civilians – right, democratic and good; 
on the other the military – wrong, authoritarian and evil. 
This view contributed to concealing the existence of a 
political-ideological conflict prior to 1964, in which there 
were civilians and military on both sides. The advantage of 
this group compared to the contemporary generation that 
defends the coup is that their struggles are of a magnitude 
that goes beyond the defense of a corporate memory. Their 
interests are more plural and tend to be consonant with 
the efforts of associations that defend human rights, in 
particular of those who suffered State repression during 
the 21 years the dictatorship lasted. Therefore, even if this 
group disappears, their positions in the battles for memory 
and politics tend to continue.
Conclusion
It is very likely that battles about the issue of the 
memory of 1964 will continue. As long as the National 
Truth Commission exists, the debate will remain and, 
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depending on the consequence of its work – especially 
as regards pressure to revise the Law of Amnesty – may 
become even more tense. The military in the reserve who 
participated in the State repression apparatus fear that this 
will result in punishment. In response and preventatively, 
they strengthen the defense of a memory that enhances 
the value of the coup and the dictatorship and show no 
signs of retreating in their intention to reveal what they 
consider “the historical truth” about the period, including, 
among other elements, the major participation of civilians. 
However, what is at stake is much more than the validation 
of a given memory as being true.
The construction of memory is a complex process. 
Among other characteristics, it is collective, selective and 
constituted in the permanent interaction between past 
and present. In the case of the coup and the dictatorship, 
the “official” memory defined them as exclusively military, 
thus stigmatizing the entire class – which affects both 
the military who defended the coup and the regime, and 
those who were against them and suffered for their choice. 
This definition needs to be revised, and the participation 
of agents of the State in political repression must also 
be constantly reaffirmed, but we cannot limit ourselves 
to the issue of “war” between opposing memories and 
to the compensation of the people affected, nor can we 
simply attest to the existence of the support and interests 
of “society”. 
It is not enough to retrieve and attest to the exis-
tence of a given memory; it is necessary to consider the 
constituent aspects of its construction and relate it to the 
context in which it was produced and the one to which it 
refers. It is essential to analyze the characteristics of the 
political dispute regarding the constitution of the public 
memory. In other words, it is necessary to qualify this 
dispute and the civil participation and to understand the 
political logic that sustained the repression. 
When we do this, we will be able to relate mem-
ory and history and identify those who really benefited 
from the memorialistic construction about 1964 which 
became preponderant: whether all of society, especially 
the left, as Aarão Reis Filho emphasizes,17 or the civilian 
masters of the dictatorship – politicians and entrepreneurs 
who supported the regime and remained at the center of 
the circle of power after its decline. More importantly, 
we will be able to understand why, if the institutional 
memory of 1964 was defeated in the “war of memories”, 
the political-economic project behind the coup and the 
regime – including the repression – not only prevailed but 
also became hegemonic.
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